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ABSTRACT 
Many people were surprised by the sudden fall of Mahathir Mohamad and the Pakatan 
Harapan (PH) government on 21  February  2020, barely two years after winning the 
historic May 2018 general elections. This article argues that the fall was largely due to 
the following factors: the ideology of Ketuanan Melayu Islam (Malay Islam Supremacy); 
the Mahathir-Anwar dispute; Mahathir’s own role in trying to reduce the role of the 
non-Malays in the government; and the manufactured fear among the Malay polity that 
the Malays and Islam were under threat. It concludes that the majority of the Malay 
population, and the Malay establishment, are not ready to share political power with the 
non- Malays. 
 
Introduction 
 
Many people were shocked when the Barisan National (BN or National Front) 
govern- ment lost its majority in the May 2018 general elections. After all, BN 
had been in power since independence in 1957 and the Federation of 
Malaysia was generally regarded as a stable, one-party regime. What was 
even more remarkable was that the person responsible for Malaysia’s first 
regime change, Mahathir Mohammad, was also Malaysia’s erstwhile longest 
serving prime minister. He had headed the BN from 1981 to 2003 and was 
widely regarded as Malaysia’s strongman. In 2017, he assumed leader- ship of 
the then-opposition Pakatan Harapan (PH or Alliance of Hope) coalition and led 
the coalition to victory on 9 May 2018. He is remarkable as well for the fact 
that he became, at the age of 93, the world’s oldest elected leader.1 
The was great hope that Malaysia would join the global club of democracy but 
less than two years on, the PH government fell apart on 21 February 2020. 
Mahathir was widely expected to be reappointed to head a new coalition, 
Perikatan Nasional (National Alliance), but on 1 March 2020, one of his former 
colleagues, Muhyiddin Yassin, was sworn in as Malaysia’s eighth prime 
minister. 
 
 
This article will lay out the major causes of the sudden change, in particular, 
the ideology of Ketuanan Melayu Islam (Malay Islam Supremacy), the 
underlying currents that led to the change of government, and the 
consequences of the change. The central argument presented here is that the 
political ideology of Ketuanan Melayu Islam was the major ideological trigger for 
the collapse of the PH government and the political con- sequences are bound 
to be disappointing for those who think that Malaysia can be a successful 
example of a multi-cultural and multi-religious polity. To put it bluntly, the 
majority of the Malay population, and the Malay establishment, are not 
ready to share power with the non-Malays. 
 
Ketuanan Melayu Islam 
Since the 1969 racial riots, UMNO’s core ideology has been Ketuanan Melayu 
Islam. The narrative was best summarised by a senior UMNO functionary as: 
 
Let us make no mistake – the political system in Malaysia is founded on Malay 
dominance. The Malays must be (as) politically dominant in Malaysia as the 
Chinese are politically dominant in Singapore. That is the premise from which 
we should start . . . [It] was born out of a sacrosanct social contract which 
preceded national independence. There have been moves to question, to set 
aside and to violate, this contract that has threatened the stability of the 
system.2 
 
The narrative in simple terms is this: the Malay race are the real owners of Tanah 
Melayu (Land of the Malays), the historical name for Malaya. As the indigenous 
people of Malaysia, they must dominate politically under the concept of Ketuanan 
Melayu Islam. Non-Malays can live in harmony in Malaysia, but they cannot have 
equal political rights and can never hold the top positions in government and key 
institutions. This narrative became known as the Malaysian ‘social contract’. The 
social contract, as expounded by Tan Sri Abdullah Ahmad in 1986, is taken to 
mean a quid pro quo arrangement which provides non-Malays with citizenship 
in return for their recognition of Malay supremacy and the ‘special rights’ of the 
Malays.3 
UMNO put this ideology in practice in its six decades long rule and the 
wider Malay community felt that their dominant position was enforced by 
 
 
UMNO’s relentless pursuit of the ‘Malay First’ policy in all spheres. In practice 
this translated into a host of extensive benefits to the Malay community via 
the affirmative action programme, the New Economic Policy (NEP), first 
introduced in 1970.4 
When the PH government took power in May 2018, initially the Malay polity 
accepted the new government because the top two positions, prime 
minister and deputy prime minister, were held by Malays. They trusted 
Mahathir because he was the man who vigorously implemented the racial 
discriminatory NEP policies when he was prime minister from 1981–2003. 
Mahathir had a reputation of being a champion of Ketuanan Melayu Islam 
cemented by his well-known book, The Malay Dilemma.5 
The PH government consisted of four parties: Parti Pribumi Bersatu 
Malaysia (PPBM), Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) 
and Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah).6 PPBM was a breakaway party from 
UMNO and thus shared its ideology. It was established by Mahathir and 
Muhyiddin Yassin. DAP was a Chinese- based multiracial party led by Lim Kit 
Siang and his son Lim Guan Eng, PKR was       a  Malay-majority  multiracial  
party  led  by  Anwar  Ibrahim  while  Amanah  was      a breakaway party from 
PAS (Parti Islam Malaysia). Unlike PAS, Amanah did not reject multiracialism 
and did not seek to turn Malaysia into an Islamic state as soon as possible. 
Hence, PH was, more or less, truly multiracial as it represented most of 
Malaysia’s diverse population. 
  
The underlying currents 
There were three concurrent political currents that largely caused the 
disintegration of the PH government. They were: a UMNO/PAS political pact; 
the dysfunctional PH government and Mahathir’s own role. Each will be 
examined in turn. 
 
UMNO/PAS’s Muafakat Nasional 
In September 2019, one of Malaysia’s core political conventions was broken. 
The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) signed a political pact with 
Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS). This pact, called Muafakat Nasional (national 
consensus), essentially brought these two long-standing antagonists into a 
 
 
single, unbeatable, political force in the Malay community. Since independence, 
it was understood that Malay votes in Malaysia were basically divided between 
UMNO (the Malay nationalists) and PAS (the Malay Islamists who wanted to 
transform Malaysia into an Islamic state). Prior to 2018, it would have been 
politically unthinkable for UMNO and PAS to work together. In fact, Hadi 
Awang, the leader of PAS had famously proclaimed that UMNO was a kafir 
party when the two were in political competition.7 
Less than a month later, all the large right-wing Malay and Islamic groups 
staged the Malay Dignity Congress (MDC) which the leaders of the four most 
important Malay- 
majority political parties attended: UMNO, PAS, PKR8 and PPBM. The main 
organiser Zainal Kling9 said in his opening speech that Malaysia is for the 
Malays and those who oppose (read Chinese and Indian Malaysians) the ‘social 
contract’ and Islam’s position as the official religion have to be fought against. He 
even threatened non-Malays that if they opposed the ‘social contract’ then the 
Malays should suspend the contract, i.e., strip non- Malays of their citizenship. 
In many countries, his entire speech would probably fall under the umbrella of 
hate speech. The keynote at MDC was delivered by none other than Mahathir 
himself.10 
The MDC was a culmination of a long campaign by all the Malay right-wing 
political forces to bring about the downfall of the PH government as soon as 
it took power in May 2018. They were unhappy because they felt that the 
non-Malays had too much influence in the PH administration and that Malay 
supremacy was under threat. Several issues created the perception that the 
PH government was ‘controlled’ by the Chinese, in particular, the DAP. This 
narrative was very successfully used by UMNO/PAS in the Malay polity. 
Two of the key issues used to support this contention were: 
 
(1) The appointment of non-Malays to key positions widely regarded as ‘reserved’ 
for Malays. These include the positions of Finance Minister (Lim Guan Eng – an 
ethnic Chinese person), Chief Justice of Malaysia (Richard Malanjum – a person of 
indigenous origin from Sabah) and Attorney-General (Tommy Thomas –  an 
ethnic Indian person). Mr Thomas and Mr Lim were the first minorities to 
assume those posts in 55 and 44 years respectively. More strikingly, Malanjum 
and Thomas were Christians, something the right-wing Malay groups deemed 
 
 
inimical to Islam. PAS had openly accused DAP of promoting Christianity.11 
 
The wider narrative was that the PH government was too dominated by non-
Malays. More than half of the MPs in the PH coalition were non-Malays and 
11 of the 28 ministers in the PH federal cabinet were non-Malays (contrast 
this with the new Muhyiddin Yassin cabinet established after the fall of the 
PH, where only 5 out of 31 ministers are non-Malays). 
 
(2) The PH government was trying to remove ‘Malay rights’ by stealth. In 
particular, the right-wing groups pointed to the PH government’s initial 
plan to sign the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Mahathir even announced that 
Malaysia would sign ICERD during a speech at the annual UN General 
Assembly meeting. For Malay hardliners, it was seen as the first step in 
removing Malay supremacy. UMNO, PAS and Malay right-wing groups 
organised huge public demonstrations against the government. A 
group of Malay legal academics even submitted a paper which 
convinced the Conference of Rulers to reject the ICERD. It dishonestly 
claimed that the Malay Sultans could be prosecuted if ICERD is ratified.12 
Many Malay right wing groups also claimed that once ICERD was ratified, 
Malaysia would next sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). This, they claimed, would extinguish Malay ‘special 
rights’ and Malay supremacy since it was incompa- tible under the ICCPR 
which ordained that all citizens must enjoy equal rights. 
 
Dysfunctional PH government 
One of the key weaknesses of the PH administration was its inability to work in a 
cohesive manner. Each component party did its own thing. Ministers 
contradicted each other in public, the most famous examples being in relation to 
the flying national car project and the Lynas rare earth issue. On both these issues, 
the cabinet was effectively split, and the ministers involved had no qualms in 
telling the media that they disagreed with their cabinet colleagues.13 The 
Westminster ‘collective ministerial responsibility’ norm was simply not 
practised. 
 
 
There are two plausible explanations for the lack of cohesion. First, the PH 
coalition was put together not because they share similar ideologies or political 
beliefs, but simply because they want to get rid of Najib Razak and UMNO. In 
other words, the four parties, especially PPBM, have little in common with each 
other. 
PPBM was a UMNO splinter-party and thus was ideologically similar to 
UMNO; it is fair to assume that these former UMNO members carried their 
ideological convic- tions into the PPBM. There were essentially three types 
who joined PPBM: first and the most obvious, strong supporters of 
Mahathir; second, those who were forced out of UMNO by Najib’s camp; and 
third, UMNO members who suddenly found there was an alternative to 
UMNO once the PPBM was established. Those from this last group, often 
called the ‘silent gang’ inside UMNO, were against Najib but did not show 
their opposition as they were afraid of being forced out of UMNO. Once they 
realised that the PPBM under Mahathir presented a similar ideological 
vehicle, with the president and the top leadership consisting of ex-UMNO 
leaders, they flocked to PPBM. 
The net result is that the PPBM, with UMNO’s DNA, found it awkward to 
work with PH. PH consisted of parties that were in opposition to UMNO for 
decades. Suddenly in government, they had to work with PPBM people who 
were displaying the same Ketuanan Melayu Islam attitude as UMNO. This 
led to clashes, especially between PPBM and DAP, over PPBM’s instinct to 
have more pro-Malay policies while DAP wanted to promote a non-racial 
style of politics. 
Moreover, the level of trust among the PH parties (PKR, DAP and 
Amanah) did not extend to PPBM. Lim Kit Siang and Lim Guan Eng, DAP’s 
top two leaders, were known to be extremely close to Mohammad (Mat) 
Sabu, the leader of Amanah. Both had spent time together detained under 
the draconian Internal Security Act (ISA).14 Anwar Ibrahim has served 
about ten years in prison on two separate occasions. Hence the top leaders 
in PH had all served prison time. In contrast, none of the top PPBM 
leadership had served any prison time, and in fact, most of them had 
served as ministers either at the federal or state level. Mahathir was prime 
minister, Muhyiddin, the number two in PPBM, had served as minister at 
both the federal and state level for more than two decades. Mukhriz 
 
 
Mahathir, PPBM’s number three and Mahathir’s political heir, had served 
as chief minister of Kedah. 
Second, other than five members, none of the ministers appointed to the 
new PH federal cabinet in May 2018 had ever held any public office. They were 
simply inexper- ienced in how to get the civil service to work for them, which 
was of course key to the delivery of services to the public. 
On top of the inexperience, it was widely known that the civil service was, in 
practice, an extension of UMNO. After more than six decades in power, the lines 
between the civil service and UMNO were blurred and the top echelons of the 
civil service were all pro-UMNO appointees. Some openly sabotaged PH’s 
policies. Many senior civil servants were particularly angry with some DAP 
ministers. In  a  civil service that was ninety per cent Malays, DAP Ministers and 
political appointees were described by some as ‘arrogant’ and disrupting the 
‘Malay-way’ of doing things. One particular complaint was the way Lim Guan 
Eng, the finance minister from DAP, was allowing his political secretary to take 
charge of many key economic issues. Many senior mandarins from the Finance 
ministry and other ministries were offended when Lim’s political secretary 
chaired meetings and directed them. The  ‘Malay  way’ of doing things was for 
the ministers to chair meetings if senior mandarins took part in them. The 
mandarins were not used to taking orders from anyone below the rank of 
minister or deputy minister.15 
Collectively, the dysfunctional government, lack of experience in controlling the 
civil service and disloyalty had the effect of making the upper echelons of the civil 
service even more unreceptive towards the PH government. Their attitude 
became ‘do the least possible’ as many believed that PH would only last for 
one term and BN would get back into power sooner or later. Thus, the senior 
civil servants decided that it was best to ‘play safe’, to the detriment of the PH 
administration. They knew that if they displayed too much enthusiasm for 
the PH government, their careers would be ‘blocked’ once UMNO came back 
into power. This was exactly what happened when the change of 
government took place on 1 March 2020. 
 
 
 
Mahathir’s role 
Mahathir himself played a key role in the destruction of his own administration. 
This related to his actions on the succession issue and his attempts to create a new 
Malay-centric coalition in early 2019 which led to the political crisis and the 
downfall of the PH administration. 
It was clear early on that the PH government was unstable after its first 
anniversary in May 2019. When Mahathir took over as leader of PH in 2017, 
one of the political deals made was for Mahathir to be prime minister for 
only two years before he handed over power to Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar’s 
supporters initially sang the praises of Mahathir but when Mahathir 
announced that he needed ‘more time’ to ‘clean up the mess’ in 2019, and might 
not hand power to Mr Anwar in May 2020, the mood soured. The truth is, 
Mahathir had no intention of handing power over to Anwar, despite his 
public pro- nouncements. In a revealing interview he gave after he lost 
power, he said the Malay polity cannot accept Anwar as prime minster as 
Anwar was ‘too liberal’.16 He said: 
Anwar is perceived by the Malays as being liberal. He talked about multiracialism 
when he left Umno, and he created a (multiracial) party to go against me . . . 
Anwar left (Umno) and created a party for all (races) – liberal. Then, he got the 
support of Democratic Action Party (DAP) . . . – his philosophy was liberalism. The 
Malays cannot accept this as they fear their position will be threatened. 
In other words, according to Mahathir, the Malay polity were afraid that if 
Anwar became prime minister they may lose their political power and share it 
with non-Malays. On top of this, the use of the word ‘liberal’ had another 
meaning to the Malay polity – Mahathir used the word as a code-word to 
indicate that the Malays were socially conservative and could not accept the 
persistent rumours about Anwar being homosexual (or bisexual). Anwar had 
been jailed for sodomy twice and this has been the number one issue used 
against him in the Malay polity for decades.17 
Thus from the inception of the 2018 coalition government, Mahathir had 
no real intention to hand power over to Anwar – which created political 
tensions that were bound to erupt in 2020, the projected date for the 
transfer of power. 
The shadowboxing between Mahathir and Anwar extended to the way 
 
 
Mahathir tried to weaken Anwar politically. Anwar’s main challenger in PKR 
was Azmin Ali, the PKR deputy president. Mahathir encouraged their rivalry by 
appointing Azmin as Minister of Economic Affairs (MEA). This new cabinet 
portfolio was widely seen as equal to, or more powerful than the Minister of 
Finance as the MEA handles most of government spend- ing, especially the 
gigantic subsidy programmes for the Malay and bumiputera (‘sons of the soil’) 
community. It was clear that this powerful portfolio would allow Azmin to build 
his base of support via patronage inside PKR and weaken Anwar’s support 
within that party. This was made clear when Azmin and ten other PKR MPs left 
PKR during the political crisis preceding the ‘coup’ and joined PPBM to support 
the Muyhiddin-led government. 
Another important  factor is Mahathir’s insecurity within  Malay  society. As 
mentioned earlier, Mahathir was rattled by the political pact between UMNO 
and PAS in 2019. To understand this, one needs to go back to the results of the 
2018 general elections. The rural Malay vote was essentially divided equally 
among the three core Malay parties: PPBM, UMNO and PAS. When UMNO and 
PAS came together, it was clear to Mahathir that  the  new  pact  would  
overshadow   PPBM  easily  among  Malay  voters.  This was evidenced by the 
fact that the UMNO-PAS pact easily won three by-elections in a row, primarily 
on the back of strong Malay support, using the narrative that PH was ‘con- 
trolled’ by the DAP.18 At this point, Mahathir was looking for ways to strengthen 
his own position and that of PPBM among Malay voters. He, and other Malay 
PPBM leaders, understood that if the perception persists that PH is a ‘Chinese 
DAP government’, PPBM might lose most of its seats in rural Malay areas in the 
next general election. Worse, PH will probably lose the election itself if the 
coalition could not expand its Malay base. 
At this point, Mahathir was looking at options to strengthen the ‘Malay force’ 
in PH. At the end of 2019, the state of the parties in PH was: PPBM 26, DAP 42, 
PKR 50, Amanah 11. PPBM, the ‘Malay nationalist party’ was clearly 
outnumbered by DAP and PKR, both ‘multiracial’ parties. 
Among the options canvassed was taking in an entire bloc of UMNO MPs 
(defectors from that party) to strengthen PPBM’s position in PH. The preferred 
option among the hardliners in PPBM was a completely new coalition of UMNO 
(+BN), PAS, PPBM and Azmin’s faction in PKR. The PKR faction under Anwar 
and DAP would be kicked out of the new coalition  n, thus Mahathir would lead 
 
 
a Malay-centric coalition which would win the next general elections easily 
since all the Malay voters would support this new coalition. Background 
discussions were held among PPBM, UMNO and PAS towards the end of 2019, 
with Mahathir’s knowledge but he was not directly involved. The hardliners in 
PPBM were no less incensed with the DAP whom they perceived as opposing 
and blocking too many policies deemed important to the Malay elite, including 
a multi-billion highway concession.19 The Malay elite did not like the DAP’s 
policy of trying to stamp out crony-deals and was of the opinion that this sort 
of thing would not have happened had a PPBM (read Malay) been in charge of 
the finance ministry. 
In sum, Mahathir’s search for a new, more Malay-centric coalition added to 
the instability of the PH coalition and created an opportunity for the Malay 
hardliners in PPBM to pursue the ideal of a Malay-centric government. Mahathir 
directly hinted that he was open to working with defectors from UMNO and, to a 
lesser degree, PAS. This was exactly what the PPBM hardliners worked towards 
and succeeded in acheiving. What Mahathir did not expect was that the strong 
Ketuanan Melayu Islam nationalists in PPBM were open to working with everyone 
in UMNO, including tainted leaders such as Najib and Zahid Hamidi, both of whom 
are facing corruption trials in the courts. In Mahathir’s mind, bringing together a 
new Malay-centric coalition did not include the tainted leaders in UMNO – in 
particular Najib whom he fought so hard to remove as prime minister. His overall 
plan was to bring in UMNO MPs and other senior leaders who were willing to 
abandon Najib and the existing leadership under Zahid. Over time, PPBM and 
UMNO would merge into a single entity under his leadership. This was crucial as 
it meant that the merged entity would end up as the single largest party in the PH 
coalition. Mahathir would reign supreme again and would be able do the two 
things he wanted, namely, sideline the ‘Chinese problem’ (read the DAP), and 
secondly, as the single largest party, he would have the excuse not to hand power 
over to Anwar Ibrahim. In the longer term, this would also ensure that Mukhriz 
Mahathir, his son, will be in a position to lay claim to the office of prime 
minister. 
Where Mahathir miscalculated was the speed with which the Malay hardliners 
moved to form a new Malay-centric government. Muhyiddin and other PPBM 
leaders were keen to establish the new coalition quickly and were open to 
working with UMNO, including corruption-tainted leaders like Najib and 
 
 
others. They needed as many MPs as possible and wanted entire parties to 
join them. Their primary aim was to marginalise Anwar and the DAP. 
Mahathir could not agree to this (as mentioned, he wanted UMNO without 
Najib and the others who had been charged with corruption) and he thought 
he still held sway among the PPBM leadership. He miscalculated the depth 
of Ketuanan Melayu Islam devotees among the PPBM leadership. These 
people simply did not want the ‘Chinese’ DAP in government and wanted a 
return to the UMNO/BN style of government where the Chinese components 
had no real political power.20 When Mahathir refused to go along with their 
plan and instead announced that he was offering an alternative, a government 
of national unity, which included the DAP, the hardliners in PPBM rallied 
around Muhyiddin Yassin.21 From that moment onwards, Muhyiddin had 
the numbers from a majority consisting of MPs from PPBM, UMNO/PAS, 
and Sarawak’s GPS coalition. Earlier, Sarawak GPS had already announced 
that they will ‘never work’ with DAP claiming that DAP was ‘arrogant’.22 
 
Quo Vadis and lessons 
The consequences of the  fall of the  PH government are many, not least the 
creation  of a total Ketuanan Melayu Islam government. The core parties in the 
new Perikatan Nasional (national alliance) government are all Malay-Muslims 
and all of them subscribe to the ideology of Malay Islam supremacy whole-
heartedly. They do not pretend to be   a multi-racial government; pursuing the 
goals of the Malay agenda is their number one priority. The most obvious 
consequence of this approach is that they have left the non- Malays (Chinese 
and Indians) and the indigenous tribespeople of Sabah and Sarawak out in the 
cold politically. The nature of its founding means that, in future, it must, and 
will, practice ‘Malay Islam First’ in all public policies. PAS, which has not held 
power at the federal level for more than four decades must, and will, pursue 
Islamisation consistent with what it has been fighting for since its inception. 
PAS has repeatedly said that some Islamic laws should apply to non-Muslims, 
in a country where about 40% of its popula- tion are non-Muslims.23 The 
‘Malay Islam First’ policy will dominate the new govern- ment until the next 
general elections in 2023. 
If there is a clear lesson to be learnt from these happenings, it is that the ‘path- 
dependence’ theory applies to Malaysia. According to this theory, history 
 
 
matters as decisions taken decades earlier will set present and future outcomes. 
In the 1970s,          a deliberate policy, the NEP, was instituted as part of a 
broader agenda to cement  Malay political supremacy. Over the years, with the 
rise of political Islam, it became Malay Islam supremacy. After decades of 
indoctrination, the majority of the Malay polity became conditioned to this 
ideology and cannot now accept Malaysia as a multi-cultural or multi-religious 
nation. Far more importantly, they cannot accept equal political rights for the 
non-Malays. They have been told that if the Chinese (read DAP) get power, Malay 
supremacy and Islam will be under threat. The only way for the Malays to hold 
onto their political supremacy, is to deny the Chinese and other non-Malays 
equal political rights. The use of the narrative ‘social contract’ has totally 
skewed the political thinking of an overwhelming majority of the Malay polity. 
Many younger Malays actually think that there is nothing wrong with Malay 
supremacy since it was ‘agreed’ to by the non-Malays in return for citizenship. 
Moreover, the Malays are the real indigenous people. 
The Malaysia example may go a long way in explaining why it is so 
difficult to democratise a political system if there are existing racial and 
religious cleavages, coupled with a political ideology based on a narrative, 
however skewed, about who the ‘original masters’ of the land are. There are 
strong parallels between the Malaysian case and what happened in Fiji, 
another Commonwealth country. The first and second Fiji military coups in 
1987 were influenced by the Taukei ideology of Fijian supremacy when Fijian 
nationalists could not accept a government dominated by Indo-Fijians. 
Similar to Malaysia, the indigenous Fijian conviction of entitlement to political 
power was encour- aged by the Alliance coalition government, the first post-
independent government in Fiji. Even today, there is a strong element of 
Taukei ideology in Fijian politics.24 
The final lesson from the Malaysian case is that, despite globalisation, ethnic 
nationalism – or as some writers today call it, identity politics – has never 
really gone away. What happened to Malaysia in late-February 2020 was a 
political tragedy – yet it was a political tragedy that was years in the making. 
The Ketuanan Melayu Islam ideology was never going to allow a truly 
multiracial and multi-religious government to hold on to power. From 
independence six decades ago, the Malays were told to be distrustful of the 
Chinese and non-Muslims because the latter, so the narrative went, wanted to 
 
 
dominate them. There was no evidence of this but ethno-nationalism is based 
on irrational fear and ethnic solidarity against the ‘other’. The Malaysian state 
under UMNO actively promoted this fear and the Ketuanan Melayu Islam 
ideology is now so embedded into Malay political psyche that it may take 
generations to remove the fear. The short-lived PH may have been the very 
first step towards that long journey. 
One is reminded of the old French saying ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même 
chose’ (The more things change, the more they remain the same). 
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